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IN RE McGEE

[37 C.2d

bank has shown no legal ground for augmentation of the
record made before the local board.
The alternative writ of mandate is discharged and the
petition for a peremptory writ is dismissed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J.,
and Wilson, J. pro tern., concurred.

[L. A. No. 21755. In Bank. Apr. 17, 1951.]

In re PATRICK D. McGEE, Contesting Nomination to an
Office.
ELDON JAMES MARKWORT, Appellant,
v. PATRICK D. McGEE, Respondent.
[1] Appeal-Remittitur-Proceedings in Appellate Court-Recall
of Remittitur.-A remittitur may be recalled and corrected
by an appellate court when the clerk's entry of judgment for
costs in the remittitur is improper, as where such entry is
contrary to a constitutional provision, a statute, or rules on
appeal.
[2] Costs-On Appeal-Insertion in Remittitur.-Where an appellate court reverses a judgment for respondent, and the
opinion makes no provision for the awarding of costs, the
clerk's entry on the remittitur, "Appellant to recover costs
on appeal," is correct. (Rules on Appeal, rule 26(b) (4).)
[3] Appeal-Remittitur-Proceedings in Appellate Court-Recall
of Remittitur.-The rule that an appellate court cannot exercise any jurisdiction over a cause in which the remittitur has
been issued by its order and filed in the court below, rests on
the supposition that all the proceedings have been regular,
and that no fraud or imposition has been practiced on the
court or the opposite party. Against an order or judgment
improvidently granted, on a false suggestion, or under a mistake as to the facts of the case, the appellate court will afford
relief and, if necessary, recall the remittitur and stay proceedings in the court below, the appellate court not being divested
of its jurisdiction by an irregular or improvident order.
[4a, 4b] !d.-Remittitur-Proceedings in Appellate Court-Recall
of Remittitur.-A petition to recall a remittitur in order to
award costs on appeal to respondent should be granted where
[1] See 2 Cal.Jur. 1068; 1 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp. 662.
[2] See 7 Cal.Jur. 309.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4] Appeal and Error,§ 1781; [2] Costs,
§ 60; [3] Appeal and Error,§ 1774; [5] Judgments,§ 130.
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the failure to so provide in the original opmwn of the appellate court was inadvertent in that such court overlooked the
fact that respondent was not the losing party, since his
position that the trial court was without jurisdiction was
upheld by the appellate court in reversing the judgment and
directing the trial court to dismiss the proceeding.
[5] Judgments-Amendment or Correction.-A decision is inadvertent if it is the result of oversight, neglect, or accident, as
distinguished from judicial error.

MOTION to recall remittur.

Motion granted.

Rollin L. McNitt and Edythe Jacobs for .Appellant.
Spencer E. Van Dyke and Frank P. Doherty for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-This is a petition by respondent McGee to
recall the remittitur previously issued in this cause for the
purpose of awarding costs on appeal to respondent, or, in
the alternative, to secure an order that the parties bear their
own costs on appeal.
.Appellant Markwort instituted a proceeding contesting
respondent's election to the State .Assembly. Respondent
moved to dismiss the proceeding on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The motion was denied. Thereupon, respondent
petititioned the District Court of .Appeal for a writ of prohibition to restrain the trial court from trying the action. That
petition was also denied. .After a trial on the merits, judgment
was entered for respondent. The District Court of .Appeal
affirmed, holding that the evidence sustained the judgment
and that the courts of this state have jurisdiction to determine
the eligibility of candidates for election to the Legislature.
(In re McGee, *(Cal ..App.) 222 P.2d 66.) On hearing in
this court, we held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
entertain the proceeding. .Accordingly, the judgment :for
respondent was reversed and the trial court was directed to
dismiss the proceeding. (In re McGee, 36 Cal.2d 592 [226
P.2dl], filed January 10, 1951.) Since the opinion contained
no directions with respect to costs on appeal, the remittitur
issued on February 10, 1951, with the order, entered by the
clerk of this court, that appellant recover costs on appeal.
(Rule 26(b), Rules on .Appeal.)
*A hearing in the Supreme Court was granted on November 2, 1950,
and the final opinion is reported in 36 Oal.2d 592 [226 P.2d 1].
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Respondent alleges that appellant has served on him a
memorandum of costs and disbursements totaling $418.80.
The grounds alleged for recalling the remittitur are that respondent, and not appellant, was the prevailing party on
appeal; that a reviewing court, in the interests of justice, may
make an award or apportionment of costs which it deems
proper (Rule 26 (a) ) ; that it is unjust to require respondent
to bear the costs sustained by appellant on appeal when the
position maintained by respondent since the inception of the
proceeding-that no court has jurisdiction to determine an
election contest involving a member of the Legislature-has
been upheld.
[1] A remittitur may be recalled and corrected by an
appellate court when the clerk's entry of judgment for costs
in the remittitur is improper, as where such entry is contrary
to a constitutional provision (San Joaquin etc. Irr. Co. v.
Stevinson, 165 Cal. 540 [132 P. 1021]), a statute (Estate of
Wallace, 12 Cal.2d 476 [86 P.2d 95]; Estate of Steehler, 197
Cal. 67 [239 P. 718] ), or rules on appeal (Horan v. Varian,
207 Cal. 7 [276 P. 1002]). Rule 26(b) provides: " . . . In
the absence of . . . directions by the reviewing court the clerk
shall enter on the record and insert in the remittitur a judgment for costs as follows: . . . ( 4) in the case of a reversal of
the judgment, in whole or in part, with or without directions,
for the appellant . . . '' [2] The judgment for respondent
having been reversed (because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine the election contest), and since the opinion
did not make any provision for the awarding of costs, the
clerk's entry on the remittitur ("Appellant to recover costs
on appeal'') was not incorrect, but literally follows Rule
26 (b) ( 4), s~tpra.
However, it is obvious that, in substance if not in form,
respondent was in all respects the prevailing party on appeal,
as well as in the trial court; that, had this court not overlooked
the matter of costs on appeal, such costs would have been
awarded to respondent. He should not be required to bear appellant's costs merely because of the fortuitous circumstance
that the trial court decided in his favor on the merits, while
this court sustained his contentions with respect to the jurisdictional question. The question presented, then, is whether
this court may recall its remittitur in order to enter judgment
for costs in favor of respondent. [3] The controlling principles concerning the recalling of a remittitur for reasons other
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than clerical errors therein were set forth in Rowland v.
J[reyenhagen, 24 Cal. 52, 59, as follows: " . . . as a general
rule, this Court cannot exercise any jurisdiction over a cause
in which the remittitur has been issued by its order and filed
in the Court below . . .
''But this general rule rests upon the supposition that all
the proceedings have been regular, and that no fraud or
imposition has been practiced upon the Court or the opposite
party; for if it appears that such has been the case, the
appellate Court will assert its jurisdiction and recall the case.
Against an order or judgment improvidently granted, upon
a false suggestion, or under a mistake as to the facts of the
case, this Court will afford relief after the adjournment of
the term; and will, if necessary, recall a remittitur and stay
proceedings in the Court below. This is not done, however,
upon the principle of resumption of jurisdiction, but upon the
ground that the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be divested
by an irregular or improvident order." (See, also, Isenberg
v. Sherman, 214 Cal. 722, 725 [7 P.2d 1006]; note, 23 Cal.
L.Rev., 354; cases collected in 84 A.L.R. 591.)
Following these principles, it has been held that a remittitur
may be recalled where the reviewing court was imposed upon
by counsel (Trumpler v. Trttmpler, 123 Cal. 248, 253 [55 P~
1008] ) , where the decision was predicated upon a mistake of
fact by the appellate court (In re Rothrock, 14 Cal.2d 34, 38
[92 P.2d 634]; see, Holloway v. Galliac, 49 Cal. 149), or was
improvidently rendered without due consideration of the facts
of the case (Municipal Bond Co. v. City of Riverside, 138 Cal.
App. 267, 288 [32 P.2d 661] ; cf. Haydel v. Morton, 28 Cal.
App.2d 383, 385 [82 P.2d 623]), or was the result of inadvertence on the part of the court (In re Bill's Estate, 7 Cal.
Unrep. 174 [74 P. 704], [order reversing judgment inadvertently made when there was no appeal from the judgment J).
[4a] In the present case the failure to provide for the
recovery of costs by respondent in our original opinion was
inadvertent; that matter was simply overlooked. [5] A decision is inadvertent if it is the result of oversight, neglect,
or accident, as distinguished from judicial error. (Carter v.
J. W. Silver Trucking Co., 4 Cal.2d 198, 205 [47 P.2d 733];
King v. Emerson, 110 Cal.App. 414, 421 [288 P. 1099, 294 P.
768].) [ 4b] It follows that the petition should be granted.
It is true that in several cases the appellate courts of this
state have denied motions to recall remittiturs for the pur-
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pose of awarding costs on appeal to the losing party. (In re
LeV1inson, 108 Cal. 450, 459 [41 P. 483, 42 P. 479]; Paine v.
Bank of Ceres, 60 Cal.App.2d 621 [141 P.2d 219] ; Petersen v.
Civa Service Board, 68 Cal.App. 752 [230 P. 196]; Crenshaw
Bros. & Saffold v. Smtthern Pac. Co., 42 Cal.App. 44 [183 P.
208] .) However, the grounds for recalling a remittitur were
recognized and it was pointed out that the circumstances
present in such cases did not warrant such a procedure. Thus,
in the Levinson case, supra, it was said (p. 459): "When the
remittitur has been duly and regularly issued, without inadvertence, we have no power to recall it. This court thereupon loses jurisdiction of the cause, except in a case of mistake,
or of fraud or imposition practiced upon the court, neither of
which elements appear in this case." (Emphasis added.)
And in Crenshaw Bros. & Saffold v. Southern Pac. Co., supra,
p. 47, the court said: "It is not claimed that there was fraud,
or that the court was imposed upon or that, by its judgment,
it inadvertently failed to state which party should pay the
costs of the appeal.'' The point decided in these cases was
expressed in Paine v. Bank of Ceres, supra, p. 623, as follows:
''Normally, . . . the prevailing party is entitled to his costs
on appeal as of course. If the losing party wants to urge that
the appellate court should exercise its inherent power and deny
costs to the prevailing party in the interests of justice he
should normally urge such point before the appellate court
has lost jurisdiction by the issuance of the remittitur." Such
decisions are illustrative of the rule that a remittitur will not
be recalled unless the matters relied upon by the moving party
would have compelled a different result had they been considered by the reviewing court. (See, De Baker v. Carillo,
52 Cal. 473; Ellenberger v. City of Oakland, 76 Cal.App.2d
828, 833 [174 P.2d 461].) Moreover, in the cited cases it is
apparent that the court did not fail to consider the matter of
costs through inadvertence; unlike the present case, the losing
parties sought a judicial determination as to whether the
interests of justice required a reapportionment of the costs.
As has been pointed out, respondent McGee was not the losing
party in any real sense. One of his contentions was sustained
in every court.
The petition or motion to recall the remittitur is granted.
It is ordered that the remittitur issued herein on February
10, 1951, be recalled, that the words "Appellant to recover
costs on appeal'' be stricken therefrom, that, for the words so
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stricken, the provision that "Respondent to recover costs on
appeal'' be substituted, and that, as so amended, the remittitur
be issued.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 5162.

In Bank.

Apr. 17, 1951.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN ALBERT KERR, JR.,
Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Murder in First Degree.-A killing is not first
degree murder in the perpetration of robbery, notwithstanding
the killer robs the victim of money after striking the fatal
blows, if he kills in anger because of the victim's insulting
remarks and the thought of taking the money occurs to him
only after he fatally injures the victim.
[2] Id.- Evidence- Killing in Perpetration of Robbery. -The
court is not required to accept defendant's testimony that the
thought of robbery occurred to him only after he had fatally
injured the victim, where there is a reasonable evidentiary
basis for finding otherwise.
[3] !d.-Evidence-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.-It cannot be said as a matter of law that defendant did not fatally
injure a storekeeper with intent to take his money because
such act was committed when large windows would permit
people to observe it, several people knew only the two were
in the store, and the victim's wife, on leaving them together,
had said she would "be right back," where defendant had
needed money for a holiday trip, had asked the victim for a
loan, and, after being refused, and with the day's receipts in
view, had struck the victim and taken the money.
[ 4] !d.-Murder in First Degree-Killing by Torture.-A killer's
abandonment of his victim, leaving him to die without medical
or other assistance, does not make the killing murder by
torture. (Disapproving contrary implication in People v.
Cardoza, 57 C.A.2d 489, 498, 134 P.2d 877.)
(4] See 13 Cal.Jur. 595; 26 Am.Jur. 164.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4] Homicide, § 15; [2, 3] Homicide,
§ 145(5); [5] Criminal Law, § 1000; [6] Criminal Law, § 1327;
[7] Homicide, § 249; [8] Criminal Law, § 1315.

